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SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Hant Actions by the USSE in Bospect to the Cuben Situation

TO: Miroscor, Flous and Policy The Joint Stoff

1. Reference J-5 M 806-62.

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In keeping with the explanatory remains by General Turnese resemble the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stamming from the Present Orden Situation," has been prepared.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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000233 TS

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Next Actions by the USSR in Respect to the Cuban Situation

Director, Plans and Policy The Joint Staff TO:

1. Reference: J-5 M806-62

In keeping with the explanatory remarks by General Turnage regarding the referenced request, the attached analysis, "Soviet Actions Stemming from the Present Cuban Situation," has been prepared.

SOVIET ACTIONS STEMMING PROM THE PRESENT CUBAN SITUATION

The "present Cuban situation" is here taken to mean: no further buildup of offensive missiles or aircraft; an impending dismantlement of such missiles already in Cuba; no further steps toward hostilities.

Fundamentally, Soviet actions, particularly military actions in the ensuing months will be guided by cold, unemotional consideration of the factors establishing the overall balance of forces in the world.

Foremost in this process will be the Soviet assessment of US willingness to contest, by any means necessary, a Soviet military move against any area to which the US has committed itself.

Also importantly influencing Soviet decisions will be their assessment of the high state of vigor and solidarity in the Western alliance systems.

The USSR will also be conscious of the changed attitudes of the leading "neutral" nation, India, and the effect of its invasion by China on the Communist movement as well as on the rest of the neutrals and the world at large.

A final factor influencing Soviet behavior in the next six months or so will be the danger of challenging the US twice and again allowing the US to have the initiative in a time of resolute predisposition. Again, two rebuffs to Soviet pretensions could result either in drastic loss of Soviet prestige and influence or, and perhaps also, the need to revitalize the Soviet image by measures beyond that level where the US response might be controlled or influenced.

Thus, while Soviet military capabilities remain impressive, it appears that now, more than ever in the recent past, if the USSR is to challenge the US it will more likely challenge us in a military manner on only those issues which the Soviets believe the US is willing to lose. Given this point of departure, issues which the USSR might exploit as an ostensible response to the Cuban affair do not suggest themselves.

On the whole, Berlin is less likely to be subjected to Soviet military pressures than if Cuba had not happened. It seems unlikely that the Soviets feel any real need simply to test US resolve or intentions there. An outright military conflict probably appears ill-advised -- because of the risk of general war and because the local action could be frustrated with attendant further damage to the Soviet image. Prudence and Communist dictates against "reckless adventurism" will probably cause action against Berlin to be delayed until, at a minimum, it can be completely disassociated from Cuba.

Military action in Asia seems quite possible in view of Sino-Soviet capabilities. Such action would, however, be hard to relate to Cuba. The one area that suggests itself as a "response" to Cuba is the Taiwan Straits area. Here again, there is no need to test US resolve and even greater danger of local military defeat. Other areas are not so fraught with danger, but other considerations operate to make the likelihood of action more development on local issues rather than on Cuba. Foremost among these restraining considerations are the Sino-Soviet dispute and Soviet concern lest China also fail or become able to involve the USSR beyond its own desires. The Indian border invasion has had and will have far-reaching implications for Asian and World attitudes toward China and toward Communi a. It could prove to be enduringly embarrassing, if, as seems likely, Indian resistance is sufficient to the task. It is also possible that a new, Western-oriented defense alignment will emerge South Asia, particularly on the sub-continent.

Thus, military actions which were, or could be construed to be, related to Cuba are probably viewed by the Soviets as too dangerous. Military actions which were not related to Cuba, or which could not be so construed, will depend on local issues and, in the main, are not indicated.

Military actions which might be undertaken without due risks and which might contribute, or be made to contribute, to the refurbleding of the legist into, reals be describing acts in the fields of waspess and felivery system development. Budger testing seems, in view of the recent pest, to be loss promising them developments in the general field of missiles, appear vehicles and missile defence. Dramatic describations could prove valuable — probably more so if accompanied by moderate statements of Soviet power and "forebearance under provocation."

On the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Coban affeir in a call for removed (and possibly truly's meaningful) discussions to rother tensions and the expentities of the major powers to bries about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Kestern alliences; to understore the raw fact of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, there, parkage, to play upon and exploit national constitution of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diministion of US effectiveness; at a position, it could induce the West to revert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of congruentively minor issues.

Name of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will coase to be Communists — best on world domination. Buther, it socks to convey the view that the Soviet leadership is unlikely to probe or confront the heat militarily in the next mix mentles.

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Moreover, it is quite possible that, egain efter crimis abbtement, the USER would continue, if not expand, its development of defensive military strongth in Cuba. This could be done either as a static pressure behind moves toward detente and pelected areas of erms control, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Letin America.

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Military actions which alone to undertaken without under risks and which might contribute, or he made to contribute, to the refurbishing of the Soviet image, would be demonstrative acts in the fields of weapons and delivery systems development. Nuclear testing seems, in view of the recent past, to be less promising than developments in the general field of missiles, space vehicles and missile defence. Dramatic demonstrations could prove valuable -- probably more so if accompanied by moderate statements of Soviet power and "forbearance under provocation."

On the whole, however, the most likely Soviet reaction to the Cuban affair is a call for renewed (and possibly truly meaningful) discussions to reduce tensions and the capacities of the major powers to bring about general war. This seems to be the best way now open to impair the vigor of the Western alliances; to underscore the raw fact of bi-polarity of power which Cuba demonstrated, thus, perhaps, to play upon and exploit national sensitivities of our Allies. At a minimum, this would result in some diminution of US effectiveness; at a maximum, it could induce the West to revert to a condition where its energies could be dissipated on a number of comparatively minor issues.

None of the foregoing is intended to convey the impression that the Communists will cease to be Communists -- bent on world domination. Rather, it seeks to convey the view that the Soviet leadership is unlikely to probe or confront the West militarily in the next six months.

Cuba, however, constitutes quite a problem in itself beyond this time period. The US Naval base at Guantanamo will probably continue under heavy pressure, in a diplomatic sense, once the current crisis has abated. In this case, however, the USSR is more likely to play a secondary -- though critical role. Cuba, itself, with or without Castro, will be portrayed as the sole instigator, with the USSR supporting its claims to "sovereignty" and the right to expel foreign military powers. In this connection, the success of the US in removing the offensive missiles would be cited as partial "justification" for Cuba's thesis.

Moreover, it is quite possible that, again after crisis abatement, the USSR would continue, if not expand, its development of defensive military strength in Cuba. This could be done either as a static pressure behind moves toward detente and selected areas of arms control, or as a simple device to frustrate US objectives for Latin America.